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INTRODUCTION
In the evaluation of a patient, the clinician’s mind employs
two parallel systems of problem solving. The intuitive system
recognizes patterns quickly (e.g., acute swollen painful big
toe = gout). This mode of reasoning is fast and frugal (in its
consumption of mental resources) and liberally employs
mental shortcuts (heuristics) to get the answer. Rather than
systematically exploring a wide range of options, this system
detects cues based upon past experience and knowledge,
filters information, and conducts a quick fit test on its first
impressions. Malcolm Gladwell’s best seller Blink celebrated
this approach
1.
The analytical system takes a more conscious and deliber-
ate approach to problem solving. This can take the form of
extensive data collection and analysis, algorithms, patho-
physiologic reasoning, or statistical analysis (Bayes' theo-
rem). This system consumes more cognitive resources,
involves the consideration of multiple hypotheses, and tries
to avoid shortcuts.
These two diagnostic approaches exist on a continuum and
are both engaged to some degree in every patient encounter
with bidirectional synergies, checks, and overrides
2.T r a d i -
tionally in psychology and in medicine the analytical system
has been treated as the superior, error-free form of thinking,
but neuroscience reveals a more nuanced picture that has
implications for how we understand and teach clinical
reasoning.
GUT FEELINGS
In this issue, Stolper et al. introduce gut feelings as a sense
of alarm or reassurance that a clinician experiences early in
a clinical encounter
3. The authors distinguish gut feelings
as a particular subset of intuition by emphasizing an
association with prognostic rather than diagnostic results,
the influence of emotions in their formation, and the
somatic sensations a physician may experience when gut
feelings arise. They emphasize that these specific elements
have received relatively little attention in the clinical
reasoning literature, which focuses on diagnostic rather
than prognostic accuracy and infrequently mentions the
affective or somatic state of the physician decision maker.
The authors’ call for medicine to expand its concept of
intuition is welcomed, as the essential roles of expected
outcomes and emotions in decision making are already
well defined in the cognitive and decision psychology
literature
4.
H o w e v e r ,t h ec a s et h a tS t o l p e re ta l .m a k ef o re s t a b l i s h i n g
a separate track of clinical reasoning is less compelling.
Intuition resides in the unconscious mind and unfolds
rapidly, which makes it very challenging for neuroscientists
to deconstruct. Although elegant neuroimaging and psycho-
logical experiments attest to intuition’s remarkable compu-
tational power, we are only just beginning to discover the
inner workings of this “black box.” There are no clearly
defined subprocesses of intuition that can readily serve the
clinician or teacher in the classroom or at the bedside.
Both intuition and gut feelings (as defined by Stolper et al.)
rely on early environmental cues, require experience with
similar situations (which includes knowledge of outcomes),
are rapid and unconscious in their formation, and triage the
mind toward early action or more deliberate analysis (the
expert concept of “knowing when to slow down”
5). Given this
high degree of overlap, it is hard to make a case for medicine
to claim its own brand of intuition where the emotive and
somatic components are separately delineated with the name
gut feelings.
The authors affirm that clinical problem solving is a mix
of analytical and non-analytical (intuitive) reasoning, which
is the leading way that clinical reasoning (and much of
human judgment) is currently understood. However, their
model (Figure 1 of the article) creates unnecessary complex-
ity by labeling three tracks within the intuition-analysis
continuum: medical decision making (mathematical analy-
sis), medical problem solving (non-mathematical cognitive
processing), and gut feelings. First, as noted above, gut
feelings are not sufficiently differentiated from intuition as to
warrant a track. Second, the terms “medical decision
making” and “medical problem solving” are currently used
interchangeably with little reference to the historically based
but linguistically ambiguous distinction. Finally, mathemat-
ical analysis (i.e., doing sequential calculations with Bayes'
theorem) is so vanishingly rare in everyday practice that it
does not warrant the “track” label; rather, it exemplifies the
most rarefied form of analytical reasoning.
In summary, given what is (and is not) known about how
doctors reason, teachers and clinicians are currently best Published online November 23, 2010
107served by understanding the interplay between intuition and
analysis, rather than math versus non-math, or gut feelings
versus non-gut feelings intuition
6.
TRUSTING INTUITION
These issues withstanding, Stolper et al. take an important
stance in elevating the stature of intuition in clinical decision
making. Supporting intuition in medicine and medical educa-
tion is not easy. The phrase “intuitive decision making” brings
to mind heuristics, emotions, and experiential rather than
evidence-driven reasoning—a combination that makes some
clinicians uncomfortable
7. These concerns, oftentimes but-
tressed by post-hoc analysis of medical errors, lead to the
assertion that intuitive reasoning should be replaced or at
least verified by the supposedly more error-free analytical
reasoning. Research shows however that analysis does not
always have the upper hand
8.
Studies within and outside of medicine demonstrate that
intuition—the earliest impressions we form when confronted
withaproblem—canbemoreaccuratethananalyticalreasoning.
The Iowa gambling task famously demonstrated that when
subjects are asked to choose cards among multiple decks with
the goal of maximizing profit, the intuitive system (as reflected in
skin conductance measurements of hand perspiration) discerns
optimal choices after sorting through only 10 cards, while the
rational mind takes nearly 50 cards to detect a similar pattern
9.
Studies of decision-making in nursing, firefighting, engineering,
and the military reveal that experts’ solutions to complex and
challengingsituations often ariseimmediately withoutconscious
deliberation among options
10,11. Studies of physicians have
repeatedly demonstrated that the single best predictor of diag-
nostic accuracy is the early (within minutes) consideration of the
correct diagnosis, a process that is arguably governed by
intuition given the relative paucity of data early in the encoun-
ter
12,13.
Multiple experimental studies have shown that instruct-
ing trainees to use intuition can lead to equal or greater
accuracy than analytical reasoning. Regehr et al. demon-
strated that asking first year residents to diagnose skin
conditions using first impressions yielded the same accu-
racy as asking them to take an analytical approach
(compare and contrast against competing diagnoses)
14.
Ark, Eva, and colleagues showed that instructing students
to use pattern recognition in EKG diagnosis works as well
as asking students to list all the features of the tracing
and that performance is optimized when trainees are
instructed to do both (“trust, but verify”)
15–17.d eV r i e se t
al. demonstrated that psychology students who used
unconscious reasoning outperformed classmates who con-
sciously tried to reach a DSM-IV diagnosis for a presented
case
18.
Arguing the superiority of analysis or intuition is hope-
lessly quixotic. Experimental manipulations of task difficul-
ty, task familiarity, and decision-maker experience can easily
tip the balance in favor of one or the other mode
19,20.T h e
emerging message from the psychology literature is that
intuition stands as an equal partner with analysis in human
decision making. The early lesson from the medical educa-
tion literature is that we can reasonably empower learners to
consider similarity and previous patterns—just like prac-
tioners do in real life—even when experience is limited.
EDUCATION
What should teachers do with this understanding of how we
reason? Students will intuit and analyze without any instruc-
tion. That is a product of the neural hardwiring we are all born
with. Teachers add value by helping trainees refine their own
interplay and coordination between these two systems. Tea-
chers can explicitly point out scenarios where is it appropriate
to trust intuitions and patterns, when to trust but verify, and
when to abandon intuition and employ pathophysiology,
algorithms, statistics, or any other rigorous form of analytical
thought. When appropriate, teachers can share their own
intuition—or any of its more palatable synonyms (non-analyt-
ical reasoning, pattern recognition, rapid cognition, thin
slicing, gut feelings)—without creating an artificial analysis,
and they can invite their trainees to do the same. Both parties
can sharpen their intuition through reflection and feedback
21.
Much work remains to determine what this form of instruction
looks like in the clinical environment.
One last point merits attention, lest it trip up teachers or
learners: intuition is not the enemy of evidence-based medi-
cine
22. By definition, intuition, because of its rapidity, does not
encompass the search for new scientific information in the
moment, but intuitive thinking does not imply any resistance
to doing so. Every trip to the medical literature (analytical
reasoning by definition) contributes to the clinician’s unique
combination of experience and medical knowledge that forms
the basis of future intuitive decisions. Expert clinical judgment
is characterized by an adroit self-regulatory sense of when
intuition is insufficient and analysis is necessary
5.W h e n
intuition is viewed in this way—as a powerful decision-making
process and not a fondness of disregarding evidence—a
smoother incorporation into conversation and modern teach-
ing can be achieved. Intuition is far from perfect, but it works.
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